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Abstract 
 
Blasting operation is common method in hard rock excavation at civil engineering and mining sites. 
Rock blasting results in the fragmentation along with environmental hazards such as fly rock, ground 
vibration, air-blast, dust and fumes. Most of the common accidents associated with blasting are 
due to fly rock. A fly rock accident had occurred on 15 July 2015 at a construction site at Johor, 
Malaysia. Due to this accident, nearby factory worker was killed while two other workers were 
seriously injured after being hit by rock debris from an explosion at construction site, 200 m away 
from the factory. The main purpose of this study is to investigate the causes of fly rock accident 
based on geological structures and blasting practice such as blast design, pre inspection on 
geological structures, identifying danger zone due to blasting and communication and evacuation 
of personnel before blast.  It can be concluded that fly rock could have been controlled in three 
stages; initial drilling of holes based on blast design, ensure limiting charge for holes having less 
burden or having geological discontinuity, and selecting proper sequence of initiation of holes. 
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Abstrak 
 
Kerja letupan adalah kaedah lumrah dalam pengorekan batuan keras di tapak kejuruteraan 
awam dan perlombongan. Letupan batu akan menghasilkan pecahan batuan dalam saiz yang 
mudah dikerjakan, disamping mengakibatkan permasalahan alam sekitar dan mengancam 
keselamatan seperti batu liar, gegaran tanah, letupan udara, habuk dan pembebasan gas 
merbahaya. Kemalangan melibatkan batu liar telah berlaku pada 15 Julai 2015 di tapak 
pembinaan di Johor, Malaysia. Akibat kemalangan ini, seorang pekerja di kilang berhampiran 
telah terkorban manakala dua orang lagi telah tercedera apabila terkena batu liar yang 
berterbangan dari tapak pembinaan yang terletak 200 m dari kilang. Tujuan kajian ini adalah bagi 
mengkaji sebab-sebab kemalangan batu liar berdasarkan struktur geologi dan tatacara kerja 
letupan seperti rekabentuk letupan, pengenalpastian zon penampan, serta komunikasi dan 
pemindahan pekerja sebelum letupan. Boleh disimpulkan bahawa batu liar boleh dikawal melalui 
tiga peringkat; penggerudian awal lubang berdasarkan rekabentuk letupan, memastikan had caj 
untuk lubang yang mempunyai bebanan yang kecil atau mempunyai ketidakselanjaran geologi, 
dan memilih urutan lubang yang betul untuk memulakan letupan. 
 
Kata kunci: Letupan batu, kemalangan batu liar, struktur geologi, tatacara letupan 
 
 
© 2016 Penerbit UTM Press. All right served 
  
 
16                           Edy Tonnizam Mohamad et al. / Jurnal Teknologi (Sciences & Engineering) 78: 8–6 (2016) 15–21 
 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
In hard rock excavation for civil construction and 
mining sites, explosives are the best economic and 
cheapest source for rock fragmentation. Hence, 
blasting is common method used. Small amount of 
energy is utilised and rest is wasted in the form of 
ground vibration, fly rock, back breaks, air blast 
and etc. [1]. Fly rock due to rock blasting has been 
serious problem causing danger to human beings 
and damage to property [2]. Environmental 
hazards of surface blasting are mainly due to fly 
rock, lack of adequate security in blasting area, 
misfire and premature blast [3]. During 21 year 
period of from 1978 to 1998 in surface mines, the 
major causes of blast injuries were due to fly rock 
and lack of security accounted for 68.2 % of total 
blast injuries [4]. The main causes of fly rock in 
limestone quarry were geological conditions, 
inadequate stemming length and back break from 
previous blast [5]. Maximum fly rock distance in 
study at limestone quarries showed distance of 300 
m and safe distance recommended is 500 m [2].  
Blast area is the area in which injury to persons 
may occur due to surface blasting involving flying 
material or gases from explosives [6-9]. Blast area 
shall depend on geology of area to be blasted, 
blast geometry (hole diameter, depth, spacing, 
burden and angle of hole), type of stemming and 
length, maximum charge per delay, powder 
factor, delay system, type and amount of 
explosives. Blaster shall be given training for 
determining blast area [10]. In the present paper, a 
fly rock accident is first reported and then the 
possible reasons for that are discussed. 
 
 
2.0 HISTORY OF FLYROCK ACCIDENTS 
 
869 blasting accidents in US [11] surface mines 
studied for a period of 16 years from 1978 to 1993 
where an annual average of about 58 nonfatal 
injuries were caused by mine blasting accidents 
and 4.75 fatalities per year for the period 1990-
1993. The main causes of blasting accidents were 
blast area security and fly rock [3] for two decades 
(1978 to 1998) for US surface mines where there 
were 19 fatalities, 167 nonfatal injuries in coal mines 
and 26 fatalities and 200 non-fatal injuries in non-
coal/metal mine. The main reason for fly rock 
accidents was due to weakness in geo-
mechanical strength of rock having least 
resistance where explosives energy could blow 
rocks easily.   
Geological factors such as sudden change in 
geology can cause mismatch between explosive 
energy and rock resistance resulting in fly rock e.g. 
mud seams or voids lead to high explosives energy 
concentration [4]. Low stability at blasting face 
may be caused in a particular direction due to 
discontinuity or cracks. Geological condition was 
major cause of fly rock accident in Masai, Johor in 
2013 [12].  
Various accidents which occurred in coal mines 
were due to lack of adequate security, not taking 
shelter by persons in blasting area, inadequate 
training for blasting personnel [4]. In case of fly rock 
accident in Masai Johor, other major causes were 
competency of persons, blast design, not given 
attention for close distance of nearby residents 
[12].  
 
 
3.0 FLYROCK ACCIDENT IN MALAYSIA 
 
3.1 Background 
 
On July 2015, rock blasting contractor held a rock 
blasting work at a construction site in Johor. The 
rock blasting work was for levelling construction site 
in the area. However, on the day the blasting, an 
unprecedented catastrophe occurred in which a 
part of the rock mass approximately 2,000 m3 from 
blasted granite flew away for a distance up to 200 
m from the blasting face. From site survey, it was 
found that the size of the fly rock varied from 5 cm3 
to 0.3 m3. Figure 1 shows the location of the areas 
involved. 
As a result of the explosion, unexpected fly rock 
covered surrounding area of the location. This 
unexpected accident killed a worker and injured 
two others. Workers involved were about 150 m to 
the west of the blasting location. Several vehicles 
were also destroyed and damaged. Some small 
fragments flew to a factory in southwest (about 50 
m away). Figures 2 to 4 show the effect of the 
blasting. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Location showing direction of fly rock 
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Figure 2 Location of the arrows shown in red and the 
effects of wild stone with orange arrows (150 m from the 
blast location) 
 
 
 
Figure 3 The effect of damage – Vehicles damaged (150 
m from the blasting site) 
 
 
 
Figure 4 A nearby factory  
 
 
3.2 Environmental Conditions 
 
The area surrounding the blast site is shown in 
Figure 5. The blasting area marked with a red star 
and the radius of 100 m from the area where the 
blasting carried out are marked with a yellow circle 
line. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Position of the blast location and 100 m radius 
area of the wild rock drift direction from the blast 
 
 
3.3 Design Hole and Explosives 
 
A company reported that, a total of 21 holes were 
drilled with burden x spacing as 4.9 m x 5.2 m and 
stemming of 3.7 m. The blast design and type of 
explosives used (provided by contractor) is shown 
in Figure 6, while the location of the blasting is 
shown in Figures 7 and 8. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Design of blast reported by contractor 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 The location of the blasting site (pictured on July 
18, 2015) 
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Figure 8 Inspection carried out on site. Red arrow 
indicates the direction of joint dominance (to the west) 
 
 
With observations on site and the information 
supplied by the contractor, the estimated volume 
of blasted rock mass is 3,000 m3, while the amount 
of explosive used was 1 tonne. Powder factor used 
in the blast was 0.33 kg/m3. It takes into account 
the 21 drill holes which identified the cause of the 
accident. Also identified from the inspection site, 
the source of this fly rock was from the line of drill 
holes in the front line. It was also observed the 
throw factor from second and third rows did not 
move far (Figures 9 to 11). 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Status of rows of holes 2 and 3 after blast (not 
moved far) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 The rock split in lines 2 and 3 and not moved far 
 
 
 
Figure 11 Share of first hole that destroyed – believed to 
cause fly rock 
 
 
3.4 Geological Structure 
 
The study was conducted at a geological structure 
of the rock mass affected to obtain presence 
information and orientation discontinuities that 
exist. The study was conducted after the incident, 
but the structure of rock left behind can still be 
used as a guide. Picture of rock face involved is 
shown in Figure 7. It should be noted that the 
quarry blasted and opened a site where serial 
blasts had been carried out. This means that the 
previous explosions had created the new 
discontinuities and cracks and fissures leave a 
larger aperture (up to 5-10 cm). 
A total of 4 sets of fractures have been 
identified to exist at the blast site. This discontinuity 
occurred naturally and there are also new cracks 
as a result of the work of previous explosions. 
However, the joint set to the west is the most 
significant (dominant). As a result of the field 
measurement on traces of structures, a stereonet 
was drawn as shown in Figure 12.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Factory 
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Figure 12 Analysis of discontinuity indicating instability 
direction towards the factory 
 
 
Local geology plays an important role. 
Orientation of joint, extended cracks and 
unfavourable orientation could posed danger. 
Explosive loading should be modified to suit the 
compensate changes in geology.  
 
3.5 Blast Design 
 
A number of fly rock accidents had occurred in 
Malaysia. In 2013, a fatal accident happened in 
Masai, Johor [12]. Both blasting sites are close to 
population and require special considerations for 
fly rock management. For such sites, a well-
planned blast design and good understanding on 
the geological characteristics are paramount 
important.  
Fly rock happened when mismatch distribution 
of explosive energy, strength of rock mass and 
confinement of charge. Proper blast design has to 
take into account on the geological structure 
(weakness plane) and proper adjustment on 
powder factor should be made in the design. 
During charging, trained blasting personnel and 
blast designer should closely supervise the work to 
ensure the designs are followed.   
It has been reported in India that fly rock 
travelled 550 m during a blast [16] was due to 
insufficient burden, stemming and improper fire 
delay sequence. In addition, factors like existence 
of fissures, joints, weakness plane and voids has 
much contributed to the accident. This case has 
highlighted the importance to adjust the energy 
distribution with the geological abnormalities. 
Regarding blast design, it can be concluded 
that fly rock could be have been controlled in 
three (3) stages:  
i. Initial drilling of holes based on blast design  
ii. Inspecting holes on the day of blasting and 
limiting charge for holes having less burden 
or having geological discontinuity 
iii. Selecting proper sequence of initiation of 
holes. From Figures 9 and 10, it can observed 
that row 2 and 3 did not move. This could 
have been due to cut off of holes due to less 
time to move front row.  
 
3.6  Demarcation of Fly Rock Danger Zone 
 
Based on demarcation of fly rock danger zone 
[17], joint properties and characteristics, slope face 
condition, presence of weak zone and voids are 
the uncontrollable factors that contribute to fly 
rock. Geological structures are the uncontrollable 
parameters for fly rock. All parameters included in 
blast design are considered as controllable 
parameters. The safety rule developed as factor of 
safety (FSH) [17] for blasting, which considers blast 
design and rock condition. From the chart (fly rock 
distance versus factor of safety), the factor of 
safety (FSH) for the present case study is < 0.5 and 
the fly rock is classified as unsafe.  
Here are several factors that contribute to 
uncontrolled blasting and can be classified into: 
i. Discontinuity studies conducted found that 
the fracture or instability of the dominant 
rock is towards the west  
ii. The discontinuity exists naturally and also as 
a result of previous blasting. This can be 
visualized from characteristics of the 
fracture.  
iii. The close proximity of the blasting site to 
sensitive area is another factor to be given 
attention. The shortest distance between the 
quarry face blasting areas with factories, is 
150 m and 50 m only. Among the things that 
can be done is limit the number of holes for 
a more controlled blasting. 
 
3.7  Support Vector Machine   
 
Support vector machine (SVM) is a new model 
developed that can be used for predicting fly rock 
distance [18]. SVM network was developed by 
collecting 234 blast data sets from Soungun 
Copper Mine, Iran with 187 data sets for training 
and 47 for testing. In the SVM model, the inputs 
parameters are hole length, spacing, burden, 
stemming, powder factor and specific drilling while 
the output is fly rock distance. The actual fly rock 
distance in the present case study is 150 m and the 
predicted distance by using SVM is 98.8 m. The 
variance suggested other geological factors such 
as orientation of dominant joints and rock mass 
properties that need to be included in the 
prediction. 
 
3.8  Blasting Practice 
 
Various aspects which are listed below should be 
emphasised:  
i. communication between nearby personnel 
before  blasting  
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ii. competent blasting supervisor should 
inspect the area during charging and 
prior firing 
iii. evacuation of all personnel in the blast 
zone area  
 
 
4.0 CONCLUSION 
 
There are several factors that contribute to 
uncontrolled blasting and can be classified into 
structure of the rock and close proximity. Further 
information is detailed as follows: 
(a) Discontinuity studies conducted found that 
the fracture or instability of the dominant rock 
is towards the west 
(b) The discontinuity exists naturally and also as a 
result of previous blasting. This can be 
visualised from characteristics of the fracture.  
(c) The close proximity of the blasting site to 
sensitive area is another factor that which was 
not given attention. The shortest distance 
between the quarry face blasting areas with 
factories, is 150 m and 50 m only. Among the 
things that can be done is limit the number of 
holes for more controlled blasting. 
(d) It can be concluded that fly rock could be 
have been controlled in 3 stages. First, initial 
drilling of holes based on blast design need to 
be considered. Then, inspecting holes on the 
day of blasting and limiting charge for holes 
having less burden or having geological 
discontinuity need to be carried out. Finally, 
selecting proper sequence of initiation of 
holes.  
(e) Various aspect regarding blast management 
practices need to be established. Among 
factors are only competent personnel should 
be allowed to perform blasting works, good 
communication and pre blast inspection. 
 
Thus it can be concluded that in present case 
study geological structure of rock-discontinuity of 
rock in west contributed to fly rock and blasting 
practice of blast design, communication, security 
arrangement, evacuation of persons from blasting 
zone, resulted into fly rock accident. 
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